During Arab-Israel war in 1973, Syrian Air Defence shot down nearly 50 friendly war planes due to mistaken identity of tracks.
It was summer of 1977. We were manning a two aircraft (Mig-21) ‘LIVE’ Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) from Bhatinda equipped with 23 mm Cannon and two K-13 Missiles (heat seeking). Around 1600h we were scrambled to intercept a track emanating from Pakistan on a radial of around 330 degrees. Radar controlling us positioned me behind the track at a distance of about 12 km. I was the lead attacker. Radar controller asked me to accelerate to 1100km. I spotted the target on radar at about 8 km. I closed in to about 4 km but did not make contact due to poor visibility caused by dust haze. I had already achieved the radar lock-on. Even the K-13 Missile head had locked-on giving loud audio signal in my ears. I confirmed the lock-on to the radar controller. My no 2 in the meanwhile was transmitting on various frequencies to establish contact with the target but failed. With my finger on the trigger I was about to press; Radar controller let out a shriek ‘Hold Fire, Hold Fire’. As I took my finger off the trigger I overtook a Canberra aircraft, our own. Enquiry after landing revealed that it was an Aviation Research Centre (ARC) Canberra returning from Pakistan after a mission. Had I launched and shot down the Canberra, it would have been fratricide. Would then the Radar Controller and I were to be blamed for shooting down a friendly aircraft?
In 1973 my colleague Fg Offr Rana got airborne from Pathankot for a cloud flying sortie. Few minutes later a MiG 21 also got airborne from same base for similar mission in a different sector. Weather was overcast with thick layer of medium clouds between 10,000 to 25,000 feet. MiG 21 pilot commenced Radio Compass let down. Radar controlling both aircraft made the mistake of misidentifying Hunter as MiG 21 and gave him a vector, which led him into the mountain peaks. Crashed remains of Hunter were found during summer of 1974. Fg Offr Rana perished in the crash. Such errors in controlling have happened in the past and will happen in the future, notwithstanding advancements in technology viz 3-D radars, IFF systems and so on.
I can vividly recall 27th Februray, 2019. We were lunching at DSOI. Suddenly our son showed us few whatsapp messages originating from Pakistan around noon. He also read out a message that IAF Helicopter has crashed near Srinagar. By the evening things were unwrapped by the secretive Indian officials and aerial engagement news became clearer.
Loss of Mi-17-V Helicopter was still not explained killing six air warriors and one civilian. I had a hunch that possibly the Helicopter was shot down in the ensuing melee involving some 40 odd fighters from IAF and PAF with air to air missiles flying around. Remains of an AMRAAM carried by PAF F-16 merely confirmed my doubt. I was nearly convinced that since the Helicopter did not crash due to technical failure, it ought to have gone down after a missile hit. But hunches have no place in arriving at rational conclusions.
Finally the grapewine started to flow and it became public knowledge in IAF circle that Helicopter went down due to friendly fire from a SAM battery.
Sad indeed! In my earlier comments on aerial engagement, I scrupulously kept away from mentioning even the ‘possible and/or probable’ cause of Helicopter shooting down. I am commenting now because the issue is in public domain.
I am not even addressing the issue of loss of Helicopter. In war situations FRATRICIDE is an unfortunate but inherent part of the war. During aerial engagement availability of time imposes severe restrictions/pressures on the decision makers, both on the ground as well as in the cockpit. Split second decisions are a norm. Launch windows of SAMs as well as AAMs are narrow of few seconds duration.
The issue is further complicated if an unidentified track appears from or near combat zone as happened in the instant case. Non functional IFF equipment merely added to the confusion. I am commenting on the issue because from media I have gathered that the AOC of Srinagar base has been removed and few others viz radar controller, SAM unit officer/s, ATC controller etc are now under the cloud since the Court of Inquiry has blamed them. Yet another news item says that the officers are likely to be tried by General Court Martial for ‘Culpable Homicide not Amounting to Murder’.
Have we gone insane? It was war like situation. No soldier would ever fire knowingly on a friendly track. Issues such as ‘why the Helicopter was airborne with u/s IFF etc’ ought to be investigated in the light of role/task of the mission assigned to this Helicopter.
I am attaching the links of various news items authored by our extremely intelligent ‘Post Event Specialists’ baying for the blood of those responsible for decision to launch the missile. What would have been the reaction of the very same people if the unidentified track actually turned out to be an armed drone from Pakistan headed for Srinagar airfield?
https://thewire.in/security/iaf-chopper-friendly-fire-criminal-charges
A senior Indian Air Force (IAF) officer and three other personnel of the Srinagar Air Base could be booked for “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” in the 27 February downing of an Mi-17 helicopter that killed six IAF personnel and a civilian. The Mi-17 chopper, which crashed in Jammu and Kashmir’s Budgam district, was reportedly a result of a friendly fire.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has removed the senior-most officer of Srinagar Air Base – Air Officer Commanding (AOC) . But the defence force is yet to clarify if the action against the AOC was linked to the crash of Mi 17 helicopter allegedly due to a friendly fire on February 27.
According to the Hindustan Times, the senior-most officer of the Srinagar air force base has been removed for related reasons. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Srinagar Air Base was removed as the incident occurred on his watch. Other lapses, the HT report says, include air traffic control asking the chopper to return to base while Indian and Pakistani jets were engaged. “Ideally, the helicopter should have been sent away to a safer zone instead of being called back to the base,” a senior defence ministry official told the paper. The officer who was Terminal Weapons Director (TWD) is also under scrutiny, an Economic Times report said, as the person who cleared the missile’s launch. The CoI is determining whether the TWD was present at the control room when the command to fire the missile was issued, or if he relayed it over a hand-held transmitter.
Highlighted portions are excerpts from various reports in media.
I am nearly certain that the CAS will take appropriate measures to stop the disciplinary proceedings since as the senior most air warrior he ought to know that inadvertent firing/engagement of friendly but unidentified tracks can take place.
I sincerely hope that IAF leadership stops judicial enquiry into an ‘OPERATIONAL MISHAP’.
By deciding to punish those involved in decision to launch the SAM, we would be punishing our air warriors twice. Those involved in this mishap must have suffered emotionally, in fact will suffer for the rest of their lives, must not be made to suffer yet again by ordering disciplinary action against them. It would be a sad reflection on our leadership and would almost certainly result in poor morale and indecision in times of crisis.
Sanity must prevail and we must stop the disciplinary proceedings. Indeed on the operational front we must have a relook at the proverbial ‘weak links’.
Gp Capt TP Srivastava
22nd May, 2019
Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey 